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Case Digest

The purpose of the Case Digest is to identify and summarize for
the reader those recent and interesting cases that have less significance than those that merit an in-depth analysis. Included in the
digest are cases that apply established legal principles without
necessarily introducing new ones.
This digest includes cases reported from June through October,
1973. The Spring issue will include cases reported from October
through February, 1974. The cases are grouped into topical categories, and references are given for further research. It is hoped that
attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that this digest
facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational
law.
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VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

1. ADMIRALTY
DAMAGES FOR SURVIVOR'S GRIEF ARE NOT PROPERLY AWARDABLE IN
GENERAL FEDERAL MARITIME ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

Petitioner, Canal Barge Company, Inc., sought review of the

district court's finding that it was solely liable for damages caused
when its towboat struck a bridge spanning the Mississippi River.
Arguing that the negligence of its pilot, Griffith, who was killed in
the collision, was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner
sought to limit its liability and to recover indemnification from
Griffith's estate. Griffith's personal representative cross-appealed
from the district court's determination that damages for survivor's
grief are not properly awardable under general maritime law. On
the issue of Griffith's contributory negligence, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that as a matter of law
knowledge of particular current conditions existing under high
water circumstances is imputable to an experienced pilot like Griffith who knew of the high water level. The court referred to the
district court, however, the determination of whether petitioner
was entitled to some degree of indemnification for the negligence
of its employee. As to wrongful death damages, the court upheld
the district court's two per cent inflation adjustment to damage
computations for loss of future earnings and the court's refusal to

allow for income tax deductions, since decedent's annual estimated earnings were not "clearly above the reach of the middle
income scale." The court then rejected the personal representative's argument that damages for survivor's grief, including compensation for lost love and affection, are recoverable under the
wrongful death action created by Moragne v. States MarineLines,
398 U.S. 375 (1970). Following the method suggested in Moragne
for a determination of the recovery justified in the instant case, the
court looked first to general maritime law, then to the remedial
policies indicated by Congress in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970) and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68
(1970) and finally to the policies of state death remedies, where
applicable in a maritime context. The court found an explicit policy against allowing recovery for survivor's grief under general maritime and federal statutory sources, and reasoned that the rationales favoring recoverability for this claim in state death actions
"are too divergent and ill defined to override the policies against
recoverability manifested in general maritime law and in the fed-

eral statutes." Petition of M/V ElaineJones, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1973).
Winter, 1973
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LONGSHOREMAN

Is

NOT THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF MARITIME

STEVEDORING AND CHARTER PARTY CONTRACTS

The plaintiff longshoreman sought recovery for his pierside injuries that were caused by a landbased forklift while he was loading
a ship. Neither the ship nor its gear was responsible for the injuries.
Although Victory Carriersv. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), foreclosed
recovery against the ship or its owners, plaintiff nevertheless
sought to sustain admiralty jurisdiction on the theory that he was
the third party beneficiary of maritime contracts between his
stevedore employer and the United States, time charterer for the
vessel and terminal owner, and between the United States Lines,
the owner of the vessel, and the United States. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court's judgment for the defendants. The court
determined that the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance ran to the vessel and its charterer, and not to the longshoreman, and that the United States as charter party had no contractual duty to the longshoreman. Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475
F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
SHIPOWNER'S LIABILITY FOR REMOVAL OF VESSEL WRECKAGE NOT LIMITED BY THE SHIPOWNERS' LIMITED LIABILITY

ACT

Plaintiff owner's ship sank in the Panama Canal. Since the sunken hull obstructed canal passage, the Panama Canal Company
removed the wreckage following notification by the shipowner that
the vessel had been abandoned, and charged the owner with removal expenses. The owner sought to limit his liability for these
costs to his interest in the vessel and her freight, pursuant to the
Shipowners' Limited Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970), on the
ground that his failure to remove, and the removal costs incurred,
were "without his privity or knowledge." Because section 15 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970), imposed
a duty on the owner of sunken craft to remove the wreckage from
a navigable channel, the Canal Company asserted that it should
recover the expenses incurred in freeing the Canal of the obstruction. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of a limitation on the owner's liability. Observing that Congress consistently has enacted provisions designed
to insure the expeditious removal of obstructions by their owners
from navigable channels, the court concluded that this particular
obligation may not be limited by the privity or knowledge provisions of the Limited Liability Act. To enforce such a limitation, the
court reasoned, would defeat congressional intent. In re Chinese
Maritime Trust, Ltd., 478 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1973).
Vol. 7-No. 1
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COURTS MAY ADOPT STATE LAW FOR MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES IN

MARITIME TORT ACTION

Plaintiff, a tugboat captain, sued defendants, union organizers,
for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff during a beating by
defendants. Appealing from a judgment by the district court that
granted him $5,000 in damages, plaintiff contended, inter alia,
that the court erred in refusing him punitive damages. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court
decision. The court found that though this was a maritime tort, in
all other respects it constituted a state tort claim. Therefore, the
court reasoned that the district court properly had followed the
principle of Alcoa Steamship Co. v. CharlesFerran& Co., 383 F.2d
46, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1967), that courts applying maritime law may adopt state law by express or implied reference, or
by virtue of the interstitial nature of federal law, and had applied
Louisiana tort law denying plaintiff recovery for punitive damages.
Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. BORDER SEARCHES
A

HUNCH IS INSUFFICIENT BASIS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR

BORDER SEARCH AND ARREST

Defendants, two pier watchmen, were arrested in their car following their departure from the pier by customs agents who had
fleetingly observed that one of the defendants was carrying a tote
bag that appeared unusually heavy. Following an exploratory, warrantless search of defendants' car incident to the arrest that produced goods stolen from the pier area, a United States Magistrate
convicted the defendants of theft from a shipment in international
commerce. On appeal, defendants contended first that the search
lacked the requisite probable cause, and secondly, that if the
search qualified as a border search, nevertheless the customs
agents' lack of the necessary reasonable suspicion to believe that
defendants were violating the customs laws should have caused the
Magistrate to grant defendants' motion to suppress the discovered
evidence. Relying on United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75 (4th
Cir. 1968), which deals with border searches of those who work on
docks, plaintiffs argued the reasonable basis for this alleged "border search." The District Court for the Eastern District of Washington reversed defendants' convictions on finding inadmissible
the evidence obtained from the car search. Finding that the search
constituted a "border search" because it fell within the "reasonably extended geographic area in the immediate vicinity of an entry
Winter, 1973
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point" as required by United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1968), the court then looked to all the facts and circumstances,
under the rule of Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and
found no reasonable basis for the customs agents to believe that
defendants were introducing goods into the United States in a
manner contrary to the customs laws. In reaching this decision, the
court distinguished McGlone on its facts and emphasized here the
lack of the agents' prior knowledge that goods were missing or of
any reason to suspect the defendants, and the unlimited and unreasonable extent of the exploratory search conducted. The court
concluded, therefore, that the mere hunch, arising from the arguably unusual manner in which one of the defendants carried a bag,
together with the proximity of the search to the border area, was
insufficient to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
amendment for border searches. United States v. Murray, 354 F.
Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN FIREARMS
PARTS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVASION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL

POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE

Appellants R.G. Industries and Firearms Import and Export
Corporation, Florida manufacturers of firearms utilizing foreign
parts, challenged the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. § 790.26
(1972), an enactment that prohibited the assembly of any firearms
from parts manufactured outside the United States. Appellants
alleged that the Florida statute, by creating a direct state restraint
on foreign commerce, violated the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution, which vests in Congress exclusively the power
to regulate foreign commerce. Florida urged that the enactment
was a valid exercise of its police power because it would protect the
public safety by removing a source of cheap, dangerous and easilyconcealed handguns, one type of gun manufactured by appellants.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the lower court's decision
and held that the statute was an unconstitutional invasion of the
congressional power over foreign and interstate commerce. While
the United States Supreme Court, in Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 400 (1960), has recognized that a proper application of a state's police power is a general exception to the commerce clause power of Congress, the court observed that this statute fell without the bounds of this exception. Since notwithstanding the language of the act, anyone could obtain a small handgun
Vol. 7-No. 1
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in Florida merely by buying one made either with American parts
or with foreign parts assembled in other states or abroad, the act
would ban neither the sale nor possession of such guns in Florida.
The court concluded, therefore, that the statute served no legitimate public purpose because it failed to protect the public and
discriminated arbitrarily against foreign commerce. R.G. Industries, Inc. v. Askew, 276 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
4.

CONTRACTS

OCEAN CARRIAGE RATES CHARGED UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BY

PRIVATE CARRIER Do NOT EXCEED PREVAILING RATES WHEN APPROVED BY FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND IDENTICAL TO THOSE
CHARGED OTHER SHIPPERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

Plaintiff, the United States Government, sought damages from
defendant steamship company for alleged overcharges in the transportation of government-financed shipments of famine relief supplies to Turkey. Defendant had carried the goods to Istanbul and
then had transported them on Turkish line ships to the Turkish
ports of Trabzon and Samsun. Under the terms of the supplier's
certificate that it executed for each shipment, defendant had represented that the rates charged did not exceed the prevailing rate
for similar services or the rate paid to defendant for similar services
by other customers similarly situated. Arguing that the "prevailing
rates" were those under the Turkish National Maritime Line tariff,
plaintiff contended that defendant breached its contract by charging plaintiff rates higher than prevailing Turkish rates for the
Turkish part of the journey. Defendant responded that its rates
accorded with those set by the Gulf/Mediterranean Ports Conference, a rate-fixing authority subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, and to which the defendant was bound to
adhere. Therefore, defendant alleged, it must charge all shippers,
whether private or governmental, the same rates. Since the bill of
lading covered the entire carriage, defendant also contended that
plaintiff could not apply different rate schedules to the different
parts of the carriage. The district court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment, and explained that its jurisdiction, under
46 U.S.C.A. § 817(a) (1970), extended here only to contract interpretation, and not to a consideration of the reasonableness of the
rates charged. Relying on United States v. Kansas City Southern
Railway Co., 217 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1964), the court then ruled that
plaintiff could not fragment its unitary carriage charge into two
Winter, 1973
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parts for the purpose of determining what constitutes "prevailing
rates" or "similar services." Concluding that defendant had
charged plaintiff the rates paid for similar services by other customers similarly situated, the court found no contractual breach.
United States v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., 353 F. Supp. 1151
(E.D. La. 1973).
5.

CRIMINAL LAW

EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR FOREIGN CONVICTIONS HELD ADMISSIBLE AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT WHERE VOLUNTARILY PROVIDED BY DEFENDANT

During his trial for having taken a motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, defendant voluntarily admitted six prior
convictions in the province of British Columbia, Canada, as well
as one in the forum state. During trial on the supplemental information alleging defendant to be a habitual criminal, the court also
admitted testimony by the court reporter from the first trial concerning defendant's admissions of prior convictions. Following his
conviction, and the court's determination that he was a habitual
criminal, defendant appealed. Since the court had failed to determine whether defendant was afforded, or waived, counsel during
the Canadian proceedings, defendant argued that, under Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the use of these prior convictions for the purposes of impeachment or enhancement of punishment could not be allowed, and must invalidate the verdict. The
Court of Appeals of the State of Washington affirmed the conviction and ruled that the defendant's voluntary admission of his
prior convictions denied him the protection of the Gideon rule.
Since the testimony of the court reporter did violate the constitutional safeguards in Gideon, however, the court remanded the case
to the trial court either for a hearing to determine whether defendant had had access to counsel in the British Columbia actions,
or for resentencing without consideration of whether defendant was
a habitual criminal. State v. Paul, 508 P.2d 1035 (Wash. App.
1973).
6.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

PROCEDURALLY PROPER EXECUTIVE ORDER HELD SUFFICIENT TO

Es-

TABLISH FOREIGN RELATIONS EXCEPTION TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT

Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970),
Vol. 7-No. 1
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plaintiffs, history scholars, sought disclosure of a Department of
Defense file, entitled "Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet
Citizens-Operation Keelhaul," that was created in 1946 by Allied
Force Headquarters, a post-World War II joint British-American
command. Section (b)(1) of the Information Act, however, exempts from disclosure matters that are "specifically required by
Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." In his cross motion for summary judgment, defendant argued that the file was "classified" under Executive Order 11652, and that unilateral disclosure of the file without
the unavailable concurrence of the British Government would prejudice the foreign relations of the United States. Notwithstanding
the automatic declassification provided by that Order for documents held twenty years or longer, defendant also claimed protection from that requirement in the exception for materials "furnished by foreign Governments and international organizations."
The District Court for the District of Columbia found that defendant met his burden of demonstrating exemption from the Act.
The court reasoned that, under EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), absent allegations of fraud or subterfuge it would look no further than the defendant's demonstration
of the file's procedurally proper classification to establish its exemption because the realm of foreign relations is inappropriate for
judicial intervention. The court then concluded that the contributions to the file by the British Government effected the exemption
from mandatory declassification for foreign governmental materials. Therefore, the court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973).
7.

IMPORT-EXPORT

TARIFF COMMISSION'S INJURY DETERMINATION
ACT OF

1921

UPHELD

As SUPPORTED

UNDER ANTIDUMPING

BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE UNDER

COURTS' LIMITED POWER OF REVIEW.

Appellant, an importer of portland cement, protested the imposition of dumping duties pursuant to section 201 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), against the entry of its
cement at San Juan, Puerto Rico by attacking the validity of the
Tariff Commission's determination that the sale of its imported
cement at less than fair market value was likely to injure an industry in the United States. Appellant contended that the Tariff Commission had violated its statutory authority by basing its determination, in part, on the mere presence of sales at less than fair value,
Winter, 1973
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that the injury determination should be set aside as arbitrary
under the Administrative Procedure Act, and that antidumping
duties should not be imposed against its imports into Puerto Rico
because they did not reasonably relate to the injury found to exist
in the New York area. The Customs Court upheld the duties and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed. Concluding
that sales at less than fair value are reasonably related to a determination of injury under the statute, the court ruled that the Commission did not err in considering this evidence. The court next
found that, under City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991
(1972), the scope of judicial review of the Commission's finding is
restricted to determining whether the Commission acted within its
delegated authority, correctly interpreted the statutory language
and then correctly applied the law. Although reserving opinion on
the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act, the court
found that even under that more extensive scope of review the
Commission's determination would not have been arbitrary since
it was supported by substantial evidence. Notwithstanding the
situs of the actual injury, the court then concluded that the same
duties should be collected on importations to Puerto Rico as to the
various states, since the statute includes Puerto Rico within the
definition of "United States." Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
UNITED STATES HELD NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING FORFEITURE

CLAIM UNDER 31 U.S.C. § 443 AFTER CONVICTING PERSON OF IMPORTING GOLD WITHOUT LICENSE

Claimant illegally imported certain Austrian and American gold
coins into the United States from Canada. After claimant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970) for importing merchandise without having obtained a license, plaintiff United States then brought
a forfeiture action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 443 (1970), which restricts the importation of gold into the United States. Claimant
maintained that double jeopardy and res judicata bars the second
proceeding, and argued that 31 U.S.C. § 443 (1970) is unconstitutional because it would result here in a taking of private property
without compensation, violating the fifth amendment. The court
rejected both of claimant's assertions and granted summary judgment for plaintiff. Relying on One Lot Emerald Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972), the court foreclosed claimant's first
contention by holding that since forfeiture is a civil action, neither
double jeopardy nor res judicata bars its institution after claimVol. 7-No. 1
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ant's criminal conviction. The court further reasoned that forfeiture of these gold coins is not protected by the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment. Norman v. B. & 0. R.R., 294 U.S.
240 (1935), excludes United States coins from such constitutional
protection, and the court concluded that since the importation of
foreign coins affects the currency of the United States, the Government has the constitutional power to regulate the entry of those
coins. United States v. Two Hundred Fifty-Four U.S. $20 Gold
Coins, 355 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
8.

JURISDICTION

STATE COURT ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AGAINST UNIONS
PICKETING FOREIGN VESSELS HELD WITHIN STATE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY STATUTES

Appellant, an unincorporated labor organization, appealed the
issuance by an Alabama court of a temporary injunction that restrained appellant's members from peacefully picketing foreign
vessels, arriving at the port of Mobile, that employed only alien
seamen. The purpose of appellant's picketing was to protest the
payment by foreign ships of inferior wages that undercut employment of American seamen and detrimentally affect the United
States balance of payments. Arguing the invalidity of the injunction, appellant contended that the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970), preempted the jurisdiction of the issuing court, that the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970), prohibited the issuance of a temporary
injunction by the issuing court in a peaceful labor dispute, and
that its activity was protected as free speech under the United
States Constitution. Appellee, the representative of numerous
stevedoring companies that operate in the Port of Mobile, contested appellant's entire argument, and particularly sought relief
from the interference with its business. Finding that the dispute
was either one between the appellant and foreign shipowners, or
one in which the intent was to force Congress to act in the international sphere in response to the picketing, the court affirmed the
issuance of the injunction and ruled that in either case these matters affected international commerce and, therefore, were not
preempted from state judicial jurisdiction by the LMRA. The
court then found that the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act are inapplicable to state courts. Observing that
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284
(1957), limits the constitutionally protected right of picketing
Winter, 1973
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when its purpose is to interfere with the right of a third party to
conduct his business, the court concluded that the lower state
court had acted within its broad discretion in determining that the
appellant's actions constituted a sufficiently wrongful interference
with the business of appellee to justify the granting of the temporary writ. American Radio Assn. v. Mobile Steamship Assn., 279
So. 2d 467 (Ala. 1973).
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BOARD OF APPELLATE REviEw DECISION ON
CITIZENSHIP Is BINDING ON ALL AGENCIES AND OFFICERS OF THE
UNITED STATES

The decision of the Board of Appellate Review of the Department of State holding nonresident plaintiff entitled to citizenship
rights was disputed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service which withheld plaintiff's passport and Certificate of Naturalization. Plaintiff then brought this suit to enforce the Board's determination, and in response the Attorney General entered the
case and ruled that plaintiff was not a citizen. The Attorney General argued that section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1970), which provides that the Attorney
General's determinations on questions of law are controlling, gives
him the power to overrule the Board of Appellate Review's decision
and made his decision final and conclusive on the executive
branch. On cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court for the District of Columbia upheld the Board's determination, and ruled that the Department of State has exclusive authority to administer and enforce all nationality laws relating to persons outside the United States. The court reasoned that the authority of the Attorney General extends to the naturalization of
aliens, and not to nationality. In addition, the court concluded
that 8 U.S.C. § 403 (1970) gives the Attorney General no authority
to review the Board's ruling since the issues in plaintiffs case were
factual, and were resolved in an adversary proceeding in which the
failure of the government to raise objections constituted a valid
waiver. Further, the court found strong due process objections to
the Attorney General's role as a "reviewing forum" in such cases.
Cartier v. Secretary of State, 356 F. Supp. 460 (D.D.C. 1973).

Vol. 7-No. 1
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A

FEDERAL COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN AN

IN REM LIBEL INVOLVING FOREIGN VESSELS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES UNLESS THE DEFENDANT CAN ESTABLISH THAT

To Do So

WOULD

WORK AN INJUSTICE

Petitioner, a German corporation, filed an in rem libel in the
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against the MIS
Netuno, a Brazilian-owned vessel that had collided with the MIV
TransMichigan, petitioner's vessel, on Lake Huron. The district
court refused to assert jurisdiction, claiming forum non
conveniens, and because another suit between the parties, involving the same issues, was pending in the admiralty courts of Canada. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated
the lower court's decision. Relying on its own decision in Motor
Distributorsv. Olaf Pedersen'sRederi AIS, 239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.
1956), which interpreted The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 315 (1885), the
court determined that a federal court should exercise jurisdiction
in an in rem libel involving foreign vessels of different nationalities
unless the defendant can establish that to do so would work an
injustice. The court emphasized that the burden is not on the
plaintiff to establish that injustice will result if the court does not
exercise jurisdiction, but rather is on the defendant to demonstrate
that the exercise of jurisdiction will result in an injustice. Finding
that the district court had used a balancing test in deciding that
it was an inconvenient forum, the court remanded the suit to the
district court for a reassessment of the jurisdictional question using
the proper legal standard. Poseidon Schiffahrt G.M.B.H. v. MIS
Netuno, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973).
VALIDITY OF FOREIGN ORDER FOR EXTRADITION TO THE UNITED STATES
NOT SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES JUDICIAL REVIEW

Petitioner, convicted of armed robbery and later paroled, left his
parole district without permission, committed various crimes and
then fled the United States to Jamaica. On a formal United States
request for extradition based on petitioner's armed robbery, which
is an extraditable offense under the Extradition Treaty with Great
Britain, December 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122, which applies to Jamaica, the Supreme Court of Appeal of Jamaica ordered petitioner's extradition to the United States. Following American reincarceration, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that Jamaica actually had extradited him for his parole
violation, which is not an extraditable offense under the applicable
treaty. The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Winter, 1973
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Pennsylvania denied petitioner's request for relief. Whether an
extraditable offense constituted the grounds for petitioner's return
to the United States, the court reasoned, was a final decision solely
for the Jamaican courts, and is not subject to United States judicial review. The court then concluded that though the extradition
treaty bound it to assume the fairness of the Jamaican hearing
afforded petitioner, nevertheless the Jamaican extradition order
was reasonable because the treaty intended extradition for crimes,
such as petitioner's armed robbery, that remain unpunished.
McGann v. U.S. Board of Parole, 356 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
RENTED AMERICAN EMBASSY HELD WITHIN SPECIAL MARITIME AND

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES FOR ADJUDICATION OF
MANSLAUGHTER COMMITTED THEREIN

Defendant, charg6 d'affairs at the rented American Embassy in

the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, killed a fellow embassy employee within the embassy. On his return to the United States,
defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Appealing this ruling,
defendant contended that Congress, notwithstanding its recognized constitutional power to extend the criminal court jurisdiction of American courts to United States embassies abroad, limited its grant in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1970) of "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction" to areas within the geographical boundaries of the United States. To support this contention, defendant
argued that the phrase "any lands reserved or acquired for the use
of the United States" in the first part of section 7(3) necessarily is
restricted by later references therein to the states of the Union. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, affirmed defendant's conviction. Holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1970) specifically grants United States courts subject matter jurisdiction over
offenses committed within the "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States," the court ruled that the broad
jurisdictional boundaries in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1970) must be read
independently of later phrases of limitation, and extends United
States jurisdiction to embassies acquired by the United States in
foreign countries. The court, furthermore, found unimportant the
absence here of American embassy ownership since the test of
jurisdiction is one of practical usage and dominion exercised over
the premises by the United States Government. United States v.
Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973).
Vol. 7-No. 1
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9.

PATENTS

DATE OF DELIVERY, NOT DATE OF PUBLICATION, Is EFFECTIVE DATE OF
FOREIGN PATENT FOR DETERMINING EFFICACY OF SUBSEQUENT IDENTICAL UNITED STATES PATENT

In response to defendant's suit against plaintiff for patent infringement, plaintiff pursued his rights set forth in Walker Process

Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965), and brought this action for a declaration of the invalidity of the two separate American patents claimed by the defendant, and for an injunction restraining defendant from asserting
infringements or seeking royalties. Defendant previously had filed

applications for French patents on the same inventions more than
twelve months before submitting its identical American applica-

tions. In each case, furthermore, the American applications were
filed after the delivery dates of the French patents, but before the
day on which notice of the identical French patents was published
in the official French bulletin, Bulletin Officiel de la Propriete
Industrielle. Under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(d), a person is not entitled
to a patent in the United States if the invention first was patented
by the applicant in a foreign country prior to the date of the American patent application on an application filed more than twelve
months before filing the application in the United States. Plaintiff
contended that since each patent was signed officially by the
French authorities on the date of delivery, the invention was patented on that date, and not on the date of official publication, as
argued by the defendant. Concluding that the defendant's rights
in the French patents accrued on the date of delivery from the
appropriate French authorities, the district court found the American patents held by defendant to be invalid as prescribed by 35
U.S.C.A. § 102(d). Noting that under the patent procedures in
France an inventor-patentee may sell, trade or publish his patent
rights on and after the date of the patent's delivery, the court
reasoned that the exclusive rights of the inventor, which compose
the very nature of a patent, ripened fully on the delivery date.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 826 (D. S.C.
1973).

10.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

REGARDLESS OF RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC VESSELS ACT,
UNITED STATES WAIVED ITS IMMUNITY BY SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM IN ADMIRALTY

United Philippine Lines, Inc., a Philippine corporation, filed
Winter, 1973

CASE DIGEST

suit against the USS DanielBoone, in rem, and against the United
States, in personam, for damages arising from the collision of the
USS Daniel Boone and the M/V Philippine President Quezon, a
vessel owned by the plaintiff. Jurisdiction was founded on the
Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq. (1970). Defendant
United States responded by alleging a lack of the reciprocity required by section 5 of the Act, which provides that no national of
a foreign government may bring suit under the Act unless it can
be shown that United States nationals would be allowed to sue
under similar circumstances in the courts of that country. The
United States then filed a counterclaim seeking dismissal of plaintiff's action, a counterclaim for damages and arrest of the M/V
PhilippinePresident Quezon to secure its counterclaims. The district court held that this action constituted a waiver by the United
States of sovereign immunity, thus making it unnecessary to reach
the question of reciprocity under section 5 of the Act. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, affirmed. The
court concluded that, under the rule of Ludeenbach Steamship Co.
v. The Thelka, 226 U.S. 328 (1924), the government had so far
taken the position of a private suitor as to waive its sovereign
immunity by seeking dismissal of plaintiff's action, affirmative
judgment on the counterclaim and the arrest of the Quezon. The
court reasoned that this result flows from the peculiar relationships
characteristic of claims arising from collisions in admiralty, which
are not present in civil cases. United Philippine Lines, Inc. v.
Submarine USS Daniel Boone, 475 F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1973).
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